As the United States prepares for the next presidential election, there are many questions in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, about the implications of the election’s outcome for the region. Whether it’s the victory of Kamala Harris or the return of Donald Trump, the prevailing sense of uncertainty remains about how US foreign policy will adapt, if at all, to the long-standing geopolitical challenges in the Balkans. However, a deeper analysis reveals that, regardless of who wins the White House, it is unlikely that American foreign policy towards the Balkans and Serbia will experience significant changes. The reason lies not in the political preferences of individual leaders but in the intricate, institutionalized nature of American foreign policy-making, which prioritizes stability, long-term goals, and vested interests.
A deeply entrenched framework of institutional decision-making shapes the US approach to foreign policy, especially in regions like the Balkans. Contrary to the perception that solely the president dictates foreign policy, international relations decisions are the product of coordination among multiple actors—Congress, the State Department, the Pentagon, intelligence agencies, and various advisory bodies. These institutions align to ensure a degree of continuity that transcends political affiliations.
The permanent US stance on the Balkans—supporting regional stability, promoting democratic governance, and supporting Euro-Atlantic integration—has persisted through both Democratic and Republican administrations. For example, under President George W. Bush, a Republican, the US supported the independence of Kosovo and actively engaged in negotiations on the future of the region. That attitude has not changed during the Obama administration, nor has it wavered under President Biden. This consistency underscores the strategic priority of the United States to prevent conflict in a historically unstable region.
When it comes to Serbia and Kosovo, there is a clear and long-standing consensus in Washington. The USA recognizes Kosovo’s independence, and this recognition forms the cornerstone of its regional policy. Despite periodic changes in rhetoric, such as Donald Trump’s emphasis on economic normalization during his tenure, the fundamental US position remains unchanged: Kosovo is considered an independent entity, and all US mediation efforts aim to ensure stability between Serbia and Kosovo, not to reopen the question of status.
Similarly, American policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina remained steadfast. Successive administrations have increased support for the Dayton Agreement, advocating for the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina while advocating for reforms to advance its integration into the European Union and NATO. Even under Trump’s more isolationist approach to foreign policy, which has minimized US participation in various international institutions, the US has not withdrawn its support for the fragile statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The complexity of American governance explains why US foreign policy remains consistent. Unlike many countries where a leader has unilateral control over foreign affairs, the United States operates through a maze of checks and balances. Key foreign policy decisions require not only the president’s input but also the consent and participation of Congress, influential lobbies, research centers, and even the judiciary in certain cases.
This multifaceted system ensures that, even with changes in leadership, US foreign policy remains firmly grounded in broader, long-term national interests. For example, despite differences in tone and approach, US policy regarding Russia’s involvement in Eastern Europe has not fundamentally changed between the Obama and Trump administrations, or now under Biden. Recognizing the strategic necessity of curbing Russian influence, both sides extend this principle to the Balkans, where US policy aims to limit malignant foreign influence, particularly from Moscow.
While the United States plays a vital role in maintaining stability in the Balkans, it has become increasingly clear that Europe holds the key to the region’s future. The US remains a crucial actor, especially when it comes to security concerns, but US policymakers have long seen the European Union as the primary driver of long-term Balkan integration. In fact, the consistent message from Washington to Brussels and regional leaders was that the EU is the natural home for the Balkans and that European integration is the best way to ensure peace, prosperity, and stability.
Unfortunately, Europe’s response was less than satisfactory. The leadership crisis within the European Union, followed by internal disagreements, has slowed down the process of Balkan integration. Political interests often outweigh long-term strategic considerations, as evidenced by the de facto halted negotiations on the accession of Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia. Internal divisions within the European Commission, combined with the reluctance of individual member states to commit to further enlargement, have left the Balkans in a state of uncertainty.
This indecision leaves a vacuum, which Russia and China have been more than willing to exploit. Serbia’s close ties with Russia, fueled by a shared Slavic identity and historic military cooperation, as well as China’s growing economic presence through infrastructure investments, illustrate the danger of prolonged EU hesitancy. The longer the EU delays in providing a clear and achievable path for the integration of the Balkans, the more vulnerable the region becomes to the influence of these external forces.
It is important to understand that the United States has no interest in allowing the Balkans to turn into another conflict zone in Europe. American policymakers consider regional stability key to preventing greater geopolitical tensions. This is the basis of American strategy, regardless of who is in the Oval Office.
For example, under Republican and Democratic leadership, the US has intervened diplomatically, and sometimes militarily, to prevent or help resolve conflicts in Europe—from Bosnia in the 1990s to the current crisis in Ukraine. A war in the Balkans would not only disrupt the region but would also have wider implications for European and transatlantic security. Therefore, any future administration, be it Mrs. Harris or Mr. Trump, will maintain a policy of ensuring stability in the Balkans, with the comprehensive goal of avoiding further destabilization in Europe.
One of the critical recommendations for the Balkans is that its tumultuous history serves as a reminder of past mistakes rather than a plan for future decisions. Painful memories of ethnic conflicts, nationalist extremism, and foreign intervention should encourage leaders to seek a path of cooperation and integration rather than confrontation. The history of divisions and conflicts in the Balkans can no longer serve as an excuse for inaction or a retreat into authoritarianism.
Countries in the region must now prioritize their future over their past. The US can provide support, but the main impetus for change must come from the region itself—and from Europe.
After all, the fate of the Balkans lies not in Washington but in Brussels. The US will continue to promote regional stability and fight malignant influences from Russia and China, but it is Europe that must take the lead in integrating the region into its institutional framework. Without decisive EU action, the Balkans risk falling deeper into the orbit of external powers whose interests are contrary to democratic governance and regional stability.
The political decision to fully and quickly integrate the Balkans into the EU is not only a recommendation but a necessity if Europe wants to secure its southern flank from the growing influence of Russia and China. Without such action, the US might have to intervene again in the Balkans—this time to clean up the geopolitical mess left behind by European indecision.