The region around the Black Sea is one of the biggest theaters of today’s conflict between Russia and the West over influence, of course, if war zones like Ukraine are excluded. In the shadow of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in the belt along the Black Sea in Ukraine’s neighborhood, processes are taking place that will determine the long-term balance of power in one of Eurasia’s most strategically important regions.
As early as 2022, at the Madrid summit, NATO recognized that after the aggression against Ukraine, Moscow would increase the pressure on the other neighboring states, which it considers to be its “historical” territory. In the strategic concept adopted at the time, NATO identified the Black Sea zone as an area of strategic importance for the entire alliance.
The belt from Ukraine via Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan is of crucial importance for both blocs. Not only do vast energy resources and corridors intersect here, but it is also a political and security divide between Europe and its allies on the one side, Russia on the other, and finally Iran and the Central Asian states.
Whoever controls this belt, and whoever has dominant economic and security influence, could be considered the most influential player in a much wider area, touching even China and India.
Russia does not hide its claims to preserve dominance in the Black Sea region, which it thinks belongs to it as the rightful heir of the Soviet Union. All the countries in this zone were once part of the Soviet Union or were part of the “fraternal” bloc, such as Romania and Bulgaria.
Moscow perceives this heritage as a natural right to influence, but none of these countries view it that way. The nations surrounding the Black Sea view it as a historical burden they aim to shed, showcasing their aspiration to join the Western alliances, specifically the EU and NATO. Bulgaria and Romania succeeded in doing this more than 15 years ago. However, their membership in the EU and NATO does not imply that Russia’s chances of regaining power are permanently diminished.
Bulgaria, for example, has not had a functioning government for three years. During this time, seven parliamentary elections have failed to produce a government, partly because a significant proportion of the electorate wanted better relations with Russia.
After years of strengthening its position within the EU and NATO with enormous support from its citizens, Romania is now facing a major test of its democracy’s resilience to Russia’s external influence.
Following the National Security Council’s findings, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of presidential elections and restarted them. The reason for this is that the security services have established Moscow’s significant involvement in the success of Calin Georgescu, who received the most votes in the first round of the elections.
The outsider’s victory in the first round was a short-lived success for the Russian hybrid operation. It combined a flood of misinformation on the Internet and social media with paying people to promote this pro-Russian candidate through their accounts. In 2016, Sputnik called this “Manchurian candidate” the “future prime minister of Romania.”
By canceling the first round of elections, Romania has taken a radical step that even more influential NATO and EU countries have not dared to take, despite their own history of hybrid attacks from Moscow. This includes the USA, where Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election marked the first significant instance of Russian interference in Western elections.
Since its invasion of Ukraine almost three years ago, Russia’s position in the Black Sea region has not been good. Moscow’s traditional ally, Armenia, wants to leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia’s version of NATO, disappointed that it was left in the lurch when Azerbaijan militarily took over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Moldova and Georgia recognized the Russian attack on Ukraine as a danger to themselves, estimating that they could be next in line for Russian troops to enter their territory. Both former republics of the USSR have disputed areas on their territory with Russian troops—Moldova has Transnistria, and Georgia has Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow can activate these frozen conflicts at any moment if it aligns with its interests.
That is why they requested in December of last year and very quickly received the status of a candidate for EU membership, expecting that it would be an important step towards getting out of Russia’s embrace. But was that really enough? Judging by the turbulence in both countries, the story is not over yet.
Pro-European forces in Georgia are organizing mass protests against the pro-Russian government, which they say stole the recent parliamentary elections and is ignoring the will of 80% of Georgians who want to join the EU.
Despite the pro-European President Maia Sandu’s recent win of another mandate and the approval of the EU accession referendum by a narrow majority on the same day, the electoral odyssey in Moldova continues. The question of whether Moldova will move toward the EU or remain under strong Russian influence will remain unanswered for Moldovans until the spring parliamentary elections.
The key word for the future of the entire belt around the Black Sea will be the outcome, i.e., the future peace settlement for Ukraine. As one of the most important links, its future status will affect other countries in the region. Until then, the northern and eastern belt around the Black Sea will remain an arena for the arm wrestling between Russia and the West.