British Ambassador Edward Ferguson’s proposal that London and Belgrade open a strategic dialogue comes at a time when Serbia must decide how it intends to work with Western countries during the new government’s term in office. In an interview with Politika, Ferguson refers to talks that had already been planned but were postponed during the election campaign. Serbia held its first round of strategic dialogue with the United States in July. I believe Serbia should accept the British initiative and approach both dialogues with far more ambition and precision than it has shown in its discussion of strategic partnerships to date.

Ferguson speaks candidly about differences over Kosovo and relations with Russia, while initially placing particular emphasis on domestic reform. This leaves ample room for co-operation even while serious disputes remain unresolved. For Belgrade, that approach has clear advantages. Serbia can make its case through regular dealings with the British government while focusing on matters where their interests coincide. Such a relationship would also give Serbia greater influence over issues on which it disagrees with Britain.

Strategic dialogue provides a lasting political framework within which governments agree on common priorities, assign work to the responsible institutions and review the results. The term itself creates no legal obligations. These arise from separate agreements, contracts and decisions, while the dialogue provides a means of discussing them at a sufficiently senior level. This makes it useful even for countries that work together in some fields while disagreeing sharply in others. For Serbia, one important gain would be reliable access to senior officials in London and Washington when a problem needs to be addressed before it becomes an international crisis. Such a framework would also allow Serbia to negotiate across related issues, linking its contribution to regional security to its demands for access to capital, technology and expertise. To make that work, the government must decide in advance what it can offer, what it expects in return and where a commitment might restrict its freedom to act later.

Serbia can pursue such talks with several states at once. Britain itself holds such talks with China, with which it has extensive economic ties but deep security disagreements. The boundaries of co-operation depend on the project and its consequences. Trade in goods, the choice of equipment for a telecommunications network, and the sharing of confidential information all require different risk assessments. Belgrade will have to show that it can distinguish relationships that can be pursued in parallel from obligations that are incompatible with one another. Every partner is entitled to decide whom it trusts with its technology, data, and money, just as Serbia is entitled to choose the offer that best serves its interests.

The dialogue with the United States has already shown what this means in practice. Results announced in July included co-operation on energy and a $50 million guarantee from the US Export-Import Bank for the development of Telekom Srbija’s 5G network using trusted suppliers. The requirement to use trusted suppliers ties the financing to the security of both the equipment and the firms that make it. A choice of technology is therefore also a choice about the terms on which financing is available. Serbia can continue its economic co-operation with China, but for certain projects it will have to decide which technology to use and whose security requirements to accept. Such decisions generally have consequences that last far longer than the tenure of the government taking them. Serbia should therefore press Washington to couple financing with transfers of know-how and training for Serbian specialists to operate and maintain critical systems. The long-term benefit will also depend on how much of their own capital American companies invest and how much commercial risk they assume, since that gives them a more lasting interest in the success of the projects and the country’s stability.

London and Washington have priorities of their own. In specific projects, American interests extend to energy, technology and military co-operation. British policy documents on the Western Balkans place particular emphasis on regional stability, organised crime, migration and cyber security. Criminal networks operating in the Balkans also threaten security in British cities, while instability in the region is a wider European security concern. London has a direct interest in addressing these problems with Serbia. The British dialogue can have an agenda and pace that reflect those needs, independent of particular American deals or decisions. I would press for an agreement with Britain on standards for protecting critical infrastructure and testing the skills of those responsible for its security, alongside joint exercises in responding to cyber attacks. Its value would be measured by whether Serbian teams could detect attacks early, contain the damage and keep essential energy, banking and communications systems running.

Serbia’s government should set out its own demands clearly and negotiate them with the same persistence that London shows in defending its interests. On organised crime, the priorities are the speed of information-sharing, the conduct of financial investigations and co-operation between judicial authorities. On investment, it must be clear which projects are eligible for financial support and on what terms. Warm words about close ties count for little to a business waiting for a decision or an institution lacking the information it needs to pursue an investigation. Britain’s readiness to commit resources and take on specific obligations will matter just as much as Serbia’s willingness to carry out reforms.

Serbia’s relations with China require particularly careful consideration. Chinese investment, trade and the free trade agreement represent economic interests that any Serbian government must take into account. Their value, however, does not relieve the state of its responsibility to assess the long-term dependence that a particular deal might create. When the deal concerns a factory, the questions include production, jobs, markets and environmental standards. For a communications network or defence system, they extend to access to data, maintenance, spare parts and the possibility of changing suppliers. Serbia will have more room for manoeuvre if it scrutinises those terms before signing, while it still has alternatives.

European integration imposes more specific obligations than bilateral strategic dialogues. In its latest report, the European Commission reiterates that Serbia’s free trade agreements must provide for their termination upon accession to the European Union. This includes the agreement with China. Serbia can benefit from the agreement’s trade terms today, but it must prepare its economy for the rules of the market it intends to join. That follows from its own decision to seek EU membership. Talks with London and Washington may help with some of the necessary reforms, but they cannot replace the EU accession process or change its conditions.

With Russia, the choices will be more immediately bound up with security and sanctions. The war against Ukraine shapes British and American threat assessments, even if the two countries’ policies do not coincide on every decision. Serbia has an interest in maintaining diplomatic relations with Moscow while shielding its economy from risks arising from Russian ownership, sanctioned transactions or dependence on a single energy source. Serbian companies and citizens bear the cost of that dependence. More reliable supplies and a wider choice of suppliers would give Belgrade greater freedom to make its own decisions, including those concerning future co-operation with Russia.

Closer relations with Britain and the United States will require Serbia to demonstrate its reliability precisely in these areas. Deeper security co-operation will depend on the protection of classified information. Access to finance will depend in part on who controls the companies involved and where the money ultimately ends up. Serbia will therefore face concrete choices about oversight, ownership and suppliers. I expect those decisions to change aspects of its relations with Russia and China, gradually and unevenly, depending on the sector. How far those changes go will depend on what Serbia hopes to gain from its Western partners and what price it is willing to pay to maintain existing dependencies. I regard it as politically irresponsible to portray the protection of a foreign partner’s privileged position, at the expense of Serbia’s economy, as a defence of Serbian sovereignty. Those in power owe citizens a clear answer about whose interests they are protecting and what that protection is costing them.

Disagreement over Kosovo’s status shows how important it is to define precisely the scope of strategic dialogue. London and Washington recognise Kosovo’s independence, while Serbia disputes it. Yet Serbia shares interests with both countries in energy, technology and security. A serious relationship requires the ability to state that disagreement openly and to understand which decisions it affects. That prevents both unrealistic expectations of partnership and the habit of allowing every political dispute to bring co-operation to a halt in areas of mutual benefit.

For the new government, it will be particularly important that such relations are rooted in state institutions. Too much has been left to personal relationships between political leaders, leaving the civil service with too little knowledge of, or responsibility for, promises made in Serbia’s name. Ministries must know what they are expected to implement, parliament what it is supposed to scrutinise, and the public what the country stands to gain. That would also make changes of government more predictable for partners. A government retains the right to revisit earlier decisions, but must explain the consequences and propose a workable solution.

Serbia should approach dialogue with Britain with a handful of specific requests on energy, digital infrastructure, investment and regional security. For each, it should identify the responsible institution, a deadline and a way of assessing results. That would give Belgrade a stronger negotiating position than sweeping declarations of friendship. London would have a partner whose intentions were clear, while Serbia would have the chance to turn British interest into lasting co-operation. Both sides would then be entitled to ask for an explanation when agreed work was left undone. Serbia should not accept a relationship in which its co-operation is taken for granted while the benefits to Serbia are repeatedly postponed. Major powers also respect partners who know how to say no and can explain why, provided they know what they want and honour the commitments they do make.

I expect the government to use these dialogues to secure more dependable energy supplies, safer communications, and the expertise Serbian specialists need to run those systems themselves. Cyber security co-operation should leave Serbia able to protect energy installations, banks, hospitals, and citizens’ data, and to keep essential services operating when their systems come under attack. Before any agreement is signed, the government must know what Serbia will pay, what it is committing to, and what options it will have if a foreign partner changes the terms or withdraws support. Ambassador Ferguson’s initiative gives Serbia the chance to negotiate those choices in advance, instead of making them under pressure when the next crisis comes. Serbia can develop relations with several major powers, but it cannot build a lasting foreign policy on the assumption that it will never have to choose. Co-operation with London and Washington will require it to review those dealings with Russia and China that expose it to sanctions or cost it access to Western technology and finance. To preserve those dealings at any price would be to sacrifice Serbia’s own development in defence of Russian and Chinese interests.